

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON  
AT SEATTLE

NATALIE PERKINS and KENNETH  
HASSON, individually and on behalf themselves  
and of all others similarly situated,

Plaintiffs,

v.

ZILLOW GROUP, INC. and MICROSOFT  
CORPORATION,

Defendants.

NO.

**CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT**

**JURY TRIAL DEMANDED**

**CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT**

Plaintiffs Natalie Perkins and Kenneth Hasson (“Plaintiffs”), individually and on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, hereby file this class action complaint against Defendant Zillow Group, Inc. (“Zillow”) and Defendant Microsoft Corporation (“Microsoft”) (collectively “Defendants”), and in support thereof alleges the following:

**INTRODUCTION**

1. This is a class action brought against Defendants for wiretapping the electronic communications of visitors to Zillow’s website, [www.zillow.com](http://www.zillow.com) (“Zillow’s website”). Zillow procures third-party vendors, such as Microsoft Corporation, to embed snippets of JavaScript computer code (“Session Replay Code”) on Zillow’s website, which then deploys on each

1 website visitor’s internet browser for the purpose intercepting and recording the website  
2 visitor’s electronic communications with the Zillow website, including their mouse movements,  
3 clicks, keystrokes (such as text being entered into an information field or text box), URLs of  
4 web pages visited, and/or other electronic communications in real-time (“Website  
5 Communications”). These third-party vendors (collectively, “Session Replay Providers”)  
6 create and deploy the Session Replay Code at Zillow’s request.

7 2. After intercepting and capturing the Website Communications, Zillow,  
8 Microsoft and other Session Replay Providers use those Website Communications to recreate  
9 website visitors’ entire visit to Zillow’s website. Microsoft and other Session Replay Providers  
10 create a video replay of the user’s behavior on the website and provide it to Zillow for analysis.  
11 Zillow’s procurement of the Session Replay Providers to secretly deploy the Session Replay  
12 Code results in the electronic equivalent of “looking over the shoulder” of each visitor to the  
13 Zillow website for the entire duration of their website interaction.

14 3. Defendants’ conduct violates the Washington Wiretapping Statute, Wash. Rev.  
15 Code §9.73.030 *et seq.* and constitutes an invasion of the privacy rights of website visitors.

16 4. Plaintiffs bring this action individually and on behalf of a nationwide class of all  
17 individuals whose Website Communications were intercepted through Defendants’  
18 procurement and use of Session Replay Code embedded on the webpages of Zillow’s website  
19 and seeks all civil remedies provided under the causes of action, including but not limited to  
20 compensatory, statutory, and/or punitive damages, and attorneys’ fees and costs.

21 **PARTIES**

22 5. Plaintiff Natalie Perkins is a citizen of South Carolina and at all times relevant to  
23 this action, resided and was domiciled in York County, South Carolina.



1           11.     At all relevant times, Defendants knew that their practices would directly result  
2 in collection of information throughout the United States while individuals browse Zillow’s  
3 website. Defendants chose to avail themselves of the business opportunities of making Zillow’s  
4 real property and rental advertising services specifically available through Washington and  
5 collecting real-time data from website visit sessions initiated by individuals located throughout  
6 the United States, including in Washington, and the claims alleged herein arise from those  
7 activities.

8           12.     Zillow also knows that many users visit and interact with Zillow’s websites  
9 while they are physically present in Washington and throughout the United States. Both  
10 desktop and mobile versions of Zillow’s website allow a user to search for nearby properties by  
11 providing the user’s “current location,” as furnished by the location-determining tools of the  
12 device the user is using or by the user’s IP address (*i.e.*, without requiring the user to manually  
13 input an address). Users’ employment of automatic location services in this way means that  
14 Zillow is continuously made aware that its website is being visited by people located  
15 throughout the United States, including in Washington, and that such website visitors are being  
16 wiretapped in violation Washington statutory and common law.

17           13.     Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391, this Court is the proper venue for this action  
18 because a substantial part of the events, omissions, and acts giving rise to the claims herein  
19 occurred in this District.

**FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS**

**A. Website User and Usage Data Have Immense Economic Value.**

14. The “world’s most valuable resource is no longer oil, but data.”<sup>1</sup>

15. Earlier this year, Business News Daily reported that some businesses collect personal data (*i.e.*, gender, web browser cookies, IP addresses, and device IDs), engagement data (*i.e.*, how consumers interact with a business’s website, applications, and emails), behavioral data (*i.e.*, customers’ purchase histories and product usage information), and attitudinal data (*i.e.*, data on consumer satisfaction) from consumers.<sup>2</sup> This information is valuable to companies because they can use this data to improve customer experiences, refine their marketing strategies, capture data to sell it, and even to secure more sensitive consumer data.<sup>3</sup>

16. In a consumer-driven world, the ability to capture and use customer data to shape products, solutions, and the buying experience is critically important to a business’s success. Research shows that organizations who “leverage customer behavior insights outperform peers by 85 percent in sales growth and more than 25 percent in gross margin.”<sup>4</sup>

17. In 2013, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (“OECD”) even published a paper entitled “Exploring the Economics of Personal Data: A

---

<sup>1</sup> *The world’s most valuable resource is no longer oil, but data*, The Economist (May 6, 2017), <https://www.economist.com/leaders/2017/05/06/the-worlds-most-valuable-resource-is-no-longer-oil-but-data>.

<sup>2</sup> Max Freedman, *How Businesses Are Collecting Data (And What They’re Doing With It)*, Business News Daily (Aug. 5, 2022), <https://www.businessnewsdaily.com/10625-businesses-collecting-data.html>.

<sup>3</sup> *Id.*

<sup>4</sup> Brad Brown, Kumar Kanagasabai, Prashant Pant & Goncalo Serpa Pinto, *Capturing value from your customer data*, McKinsey (Mar. 15, 2017), <https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/quantumblack/our-insights/capturing-value-from-your-customer-data>.

1 Survey of Methodologies for Measuring Monetary Value.”<sup>5</sup> In this paper, the OECD measured  
 2 prices demanded by companies concerning user data derived from “various online data  
 3 warehouses.”<sup>6</sup>

4 18. OECD indicated that “[a]t the time of writing, the following elements of  
 5 personal data were available for various prices: USD 0.50 cents for an address, USD 2 [i.e. \$2]  
 6 for a date of birth, USD 8 for a social security number (government ID number), USD 3 for a  
 7 driver’s license number and USD 35 for a military record. A combination of address, date of  
 8 birth, social security number, credit record and military is estimated to cost USD 55.”<sup>7</sup>

9 **B. Website Users Have a Reasonable Expectation of Privacy in Their**  
 10 **Interactions with Websites.**

11 19. Consumers are skeptical and are wary about their data being collected. A report  
 12 released by KPMG shows that “a full 86% of the respondents said they feel a growing concern  
 13 about data privacy, while 78% expressed fears about the amount of data being collected.”<sup>8</sup>

14 20. Another recent paper also indicates that most website visitors will assume their  
 15 detailed interactions with a website will only be used by the website and not be shared with a  
 16 party they know nothing about.<sup>9</sup> As such, website visitors reasonably expect that their  
 17 interactions with a website should not be released to third parties unless explicitly stated.<sup>10</sup>

18 <sup>5</sup> Exploring the Economics of Personal Data: A Survey of Methodologies for Measuring Monetary  
 19 Value, OECD Digital Economy Papers, NO. 220 (Apr. 2, 2013),  
<https://www.oecdilibrary.org/docserver/5k486qtxldmq-en.pdf>.

20 <sup>6</sup> *Id.* at 25.

21 <sup>7</sup> *Id.*

22 <sup>8</sup> Lance Whitney, *Data privacy is a growing concern for more consumers*, TechRepublic (Aug. 17,  
 2021), <https://www.techrepublic.com/article/data-privacy-is-a-growing-concern-for-more-consumers/>.

23 <sup>9</sup> *CUJO AI Recent Survey Reveals U.S. Internet Users Expectations and Concerns Towards Privacy and Online Tracking*, CUJO (May 26, 2020), <https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/cujo-ai-recent-survey-reveals-us-internet-users-expectations-and-concerns-towards-privacy-and-online-tracking-301064970.html>.

<sup>10</sup> Frances S. Grodzinsky, Keith W. Miller & Marty J. Wolf, *Session Replay Scripts: A Privacy Analysis*, *The Information Society*, 38:4, 257, 258 (2022).

1 21. Privacy polls and studies show that a majority of Americans consider one of the  
2 most important privacy rights to be the need for an individual’s affirmative consent before a  
3 company collects and shares its customers’ data.

4 22. A recent study by Consumer Reports shows that 92% of Americans believe that  
5 internet companies and websites should be required to obtain consent before selling or sharing  
6 consumers’ data, and the same percentage believe internet companies and websites should be  
7 required to provide consumers with a complete list of the data that has been collected about  
8 them.<sup>11</sup>

9 23. Moreover, according to a study by Pew Research Center, a majority of  
10 Americans, approximately 79%, are concerned about how data is collected about them by  
11 companies.<sup>12</sup>

12 24. Users act consistently with their expectation of privacy. Following a new rollout  
13 of the iPhone operating software—which asks users for clear, affirmative consent before  
14 allowing companies to track users—85 percent of worldwide users and 94 percent of U.S. users  
15 chose not to allow such tracking.<sup>13</sup>

16 **C. How Session Replay Code Works.**

17 25. Session Replay Code, such as that implemented on Zillow’s website, enables  
18 website operators to record, save, and replay website visitors’ interactions with a given website.  
19

---

20 <sup>11</sup> *Consumers Less Confident About Healthcare, Data Privacy, and Car Safety, New Survey Finds*,  
21 Consumer Reports (May 11, 2017), [https://www.consumerreports.org/  
consumerreports/consumers-less-confident-about-healthcare-data-privacy-and-car-safety/](https://www.consumerreports.org/consumerreports/consumers-less-confident-about-healthcare-data-privacy-and-car-safety/).

22 <sup>12</sup> *Americans and Privacy: Concerned, Confused, and Feeling Lack of Control Over Their Personal  
Information*, Pew Research Center, (Nov. 15, 2019),  
23 [https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2019/11/15/americans-and-privacy-concerned-Confusedand-  
feeling-lack-of-control-over-their-personal-information/](https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2019/11/15/americans-and-privacy-concerned-Confusedand-feeling-lack-of-control-over-their-personal-information/).

<sup>13</sup> Margaret Taylor, *How Apple screwed Facebook*, Wired, (May 19, 2021),  
<https://www.wired.co.uk/article/apple-ios14-facebook>.

1 The clandestinely deployed code provides online marketers and website designers with insights  
2 into the user experience by recording website visitors “as they click, scroll, type or navigate  
3 across different web pages.”<sup>14</sup>

4 26. While Session Replay Code is utilized by websites for some legitimate purposes,  
5 it goes well beyond normal website analytics when it comes to collecting the actual contents of  
6 communications between website visitors and websites. Unlike other online advertising tools,  
7 Session Replay Code allows a website to capture and record nearly every action a website  
8 visitor takes while visiting the website, including actions that reveal the visitor’s personal or  
9 private sensitive data, sometimes even when the visitor does not intend to submit the data to the  
10 website operator, or has not finished submitting the data to the website operator.<sup>15</sup> As a result,  
11 website visitors “aren’t just sharing data with the [web]site they’re on . . . but also with an  
12 analytics service that may be watching over their shoulder.”<sup>16</sup>

13 27. Session Replay Code works by inserting computer code into the various event  
14 handling routines that web browsers use to receive input from users, thus intercepting the  
15 occurrence of actions the user takes. When a website delivers Session Replay Code to a user’s  
16 browser, the browser will follow the code’s instructions by sending responses in the form of  
17 “event” data to a designated third-party server. Typically, the server receiving the event data is  
18 controlled by the third-party entity that wrote the Session Replay Code, rather than the owner  
19 of the website where the code is installed.

20  
21 \_\_\_\_\_  
22 <sup>14</sup> Erin Gilliam Haije, *[Updated] Are Session Recording Tools a Risk to Internet Privacy?*, Mopinion  
(Mar. 7, 2018), <https://mopinion.com/are-session-recording-tools-a-risk-to-internet-privacy/>.

23 <sup>15</sup> *Id.*

<sup>16</sup> Eric Ravenscraft, *Almost Every Website You Visit Records Exactly How Your Mouse Moves*, Medium  
(Feb. 5, 2020), <https://onezero.medium.com/almost-every-website-you-visit-records-exactly-how-your-mouse-moves-4134cb1cc7a0>.



1           28.     The types of events captured by Session Replay Code vary by specific product  
2 and configuration, but in general are wide-ranging and can encompass virtually every user  
3 action, including all mouse movements, clicks, scrolls, zooms, window resizes, keystrokes, text  
4 entry, and numerous other forms of a user’s navigation and interaction through the website. To  
5 permit a reconstruction of a user’s visit accurately, the Session Replay Code must be capable of  
6 capturing these events at hyper-frequent intervals, often just milliseconds apart. Events are  
7 typically accumulated and transmitted in blocks periodically throughout the user’s website  
8 session, rather than after the user’s visit to the website is completely finished.

9           29.     Unless specifically masked through configurations chosen by the website owner,  
10 some visible contents of the website may also be transmitted to the Session Replay Provider.

11           30.     Once the events from a user session have been recorded by a Session Replay  
12 Code, a website operator can view a visual reenactment of the user’s visit through the Session  
13 Replay Provider, usually in the form of a video, meaning that “[u]nlike typical analytics  
14 services that provide aggregate statistics, these scripts are intended for the recording and  
15 playback of individual browsing sessions.”<sup>17</sup>

16           31.     Because most Session Replay Codes will by default indiscriminately capture the  
17 maximum range of user-initiated events and content displayed by the website, researchers have  
18 found that a variety of highly sensitive information can be captured in event responses from  
19 website visitors, including medical conditions, credit card details, and other personal  
20 information displayed or entered on webpages.<sup>18</sup>

---

22           <sup>17</sup> Steven Englehardt, *No boundaries: Exfiltration of personal data by session-replay scripts*, Freedom to  
23 Tinker (Nov. 15, 2017), <https://freedom-to-tinker.com/2017/11/15/no-boundaries-exfiltration-of-personal-data-by-session-replay-scripts/>.

<sup>18</sup> *Id.*

1           32.     Most alarming, Session Replay Code may capture data that the user did not even  
2 intentionally transmit to a website during a visit, and then make that data available to website  
3 owners when they access the session replay through the Session Replay Provider. For example,  
4 if a user writes information into a text form field, but then chooses not to click a “submit” or  
5 “enter” button on the website, the Session Replay Code may nevertheless cause the non-  
6 submitted text to be sent to the designated event-response-receiving server before the user  
7 deletes the text or leaves the page. This information will then be viewable to the website owner  
8 when accessing the session replay through the Session Replay Provider.

9           33.     Session Replay Code does not necessarily anonymize user sessions, either.

10          34.     First, if a user’s entry of personally identifying information is captured in an  
11 event response, that data will become known and visible to both the Session Replay Provider  
12 and the website owner.

13          35.     Second, if a website displays user account information to a logged-in user, that  
14 content may be captured by Session Replay Code.

15          36.     Third, some Session Replay Providers explicitly offer website owners cookie  
16 functionality that permits linking a session to an identified user, who may be personally  
17 identified if the website owner has associated the user with an email address or username.<sup>19</sup>

18          37.     Session Replay Providers often create “fingerprints” that are unique to a  
19 particular user’s combination of computer and browser settings, screen configuration, and other  
20 detectable information. The resulting fingerprint, which is often unique to a user and rarely  
21 changes, are collected across all sites that the Session Replay Provider monitors.

22  
23 \_\_\_\_\_  
<sup>19</sup> *Id.*; see also *FS.identify – Identifying users*, FullStory, <https://help.fullstory.com/hc/en-us/articles/360020828113>, (last visited Sep. 8, 2022).

1           38.     When a user eventually identifies themselves to one of these websites (such as  
2 by filling in a form), the provider can then associate the fingerprint with the user identity and  
3 can then back-reference all of that user’s other web browsing across other websites previously  
4 visited, including on websites where the user had intended to remain anonymous—even if the  
5 user explicitly indicated that they would like to remain anonymous by enabling private  
6 browsing.

7           39.     In addition to the privacy invasions caused by the diversion of user  
8 communications with websites to third-party Session Replay Providers, Session Replay Code  
9 also exposes website visitors to identity theft, online scams, and other privacy threats.<sup>20</sup> Indeed,  
10 “[t]he more copies of sensitive information that exist, the broader the attack surface, and when  
11 data is being collected [ . . . ] it may not be stored properly or have standard protections”  
12 increasing “the overall risk that data will someday publicly leak or be breached.”<sup>21</sup>

13           40.     Recognizing the privacy concerns posed by Session Replay Code, in 2019 Apple  
14 required app developers to remove or properly disclose the use of analytics code that allow app  
15 developers to record how a user interacts with their iPhone apps or face immediate removal  
16 from the app store.<sup>22</sup> In announcing this decision, Apple stated: “Protecting user privacy is  
17 paramount in the Apple ecosystem. Our App Store Review Guidelines require that apps request  
18 explicit user consent and provide a clear visual indication when recording, logging, or otherwise  
19 making a record of user activity.”<sup>23</sup>

20  
21 <sup>20</sup> Juha Sarrinen, *Session Replay is a Major Threat to Privacy on the Web*, itnews (Nov. 16, 2017),  
<https://www.itnews.com.au/news/session-replay-is-a-major-threat-to-privacy-on-the-web-477720>.

22 <sup>21</sup> Lily Hay Newman, *Covert ‘Replay Sessions’ Have Been harvesting Passwords by Mistake*, WIRED  
(Feb. 26, 2018), <https://www.wired.com/story/covert-replay-sessions-harvesting-passwords/>.

23 <sup>22</sup> Zack Whittaker, *Apple Tells App Developers to Disclose or Remove Screen Recording Code*,  
TechCrunch (Feb. 7, 2019), <https://techcrunch.com/2019/02/07/apple-glassbox-apps/>.

<sup>23</sup> *Id.*

1           **D. Defendants Secretly Wiretap Zillow’s Website Visitors’ Electronic**  
2           **Communications.**

3           41. Zillow operates the Zillow website. Zillow is the “leading online residential real  
4           estate” marketplace in the United States for consumers, connecting them to the information and  
5           real estate professionals they need to buy, sell, or rent a home.<sup>24</sup>

6           42. Zillow has become “synonymous with residential real estate.”<sup>25</sup> Zillow’s  
7           website is the most popular real estate website in the United States, with over thirty-six million  
8           unique monthly visitors<sup>26</sup> and more than 135 million properties are listed on its website.<sup>27</sup>  
9           According to a 2021 Google Trends report, “[t]oday more people search ‘Zillow’ than ‘real  
10           estate.’”<sup>28</sup>

11           43. However, unbeknownst to the millions of individuals perusing Zillow’s real  
12           estate listings, Zillow intentionally procures and embeds various Session Replay Codes from  
13           Microsoft and other Session Replay Providers on its website to track and analyze website user  
14           interactions with Zillow’s website.

15           44. Zillow has procured Microsoft to employ its Session Replay Provider on  
16           Zillow’s website.

17  
18  
19  
20  
21           <sup>24</sup> Zillow Group, Inc., *Form 10-K* (Dec. 31, 2021), <https://d18rn0p25nwr6d.cloudfront.net/CIK-0001617640/87bbbf30-39cb-4eb7-acdc-1b51265b9687.pdf> (“Zillow 10-K”).

22           <sup>25</sup> *Id.*

23           <sup>26</sup> *Most Popular Real Estate Websites in the United States as of October 2021, Based on Unique Monthly Visits*, Statista, <https://www.statista.com/statistics/381468/most-popular-real-estate-websites-by-monthly-visits-usa/>, (last visited Sep. 8, 2022).

<sup>27</sup> Zillow 10-K, *supra*, note 1.

<sup>28</sup> *Id.*

1 45. Microsoft is the owner and operator of a Session Replay Code called Clarity,  
2 which provides basic information about website user sessions, interactions, and engagement,  
3 and breaks down users by device type, county, and other dimensions.<sup>29</sup>

4 46. Clarity captures a user's interactions with a website, logging every website  
5 user's mouse movements and clicks, scrolling window resizing, user inputs, and more.<sup>30</sup>  
6 Indeed, Clarity organizes the information it captures into over 30 different categories including:  
7 the date a user visited the website, the device the user accessed the website on, the type of  
8 browser the user accessed the website on, the operating system of the device used to access the  
9 website, the country where the user accessed the website from, a user's mouse movements, a  
10 user's screen swipes, text inputted by the user on the website, and how far down a webpage a  
11 user scrolls.<sup>31</sup> Clarity even provides a specific user ID to each website visitor so their website  
12 use and interactions can be monitored over time.<sup>32</sup>

13 47. The information collected and recorded by Clarity can then be used to play back  
14 a user's journey through a website, showing how they interacted with site navigation, calls to  
15 action, search features, and other on-page elements.<sup>33</sup> Put differently, the information Clarity  
16 captures can be translated into a simulation video of how a user interacts with a website.

17 48. Clarity also uses the information captured to create detailed heatmaps of a  
18 website that provide information about which elements of a website have high user  
19

20 \_\_\_\_\_  
21 <sup>29</sup> Jono Alderson, *An Introduction to Microsoft Clarity*, Yoast, <https://yoast.com/introduction-microsoft-clarity/#h-what-is-microsoft-clarity>, (last visited Sep. 8, 2022).

22 <sup>30</sup> *Clarity Data Collection*, Microsoft, <https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/clarity/clarity-data>, (last visited Aug. 24, 2022).

23 <sup>31</sup> *Filters Overview*, Microsoft (Jul. 26, 2022), <https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/clarity/clarity-filters>.

<sup>32</sup> *Id.*

<sup>33</sup> Roger Montti, *Microsoft Clarity Analytics: Everything You Need to Know*, SEJ (Jan. 19, 2022), <https://www.searchenginejournal.com/microsoft-clarity-analytics-overview/419311/#close>.

1 engagement, how far website users scrolled on the website, and the total clicks within a given  
2 area on the website.<sup>34</sup>

3 49. As such, Clarity collects highly personal information and substantive  
4 communications that can be tied to directly to a website user's identity as it monitors, records,  
5 and collects a website user's every move.

6 50. Clarity offers websites three standard approaches when it comes to masking  
7 sensitive information collected from a user's interactions with a website: strict (all text entered  
8 by a user is purportedly masked), balanced (sensitive text entered into certain specifically pre-  
9 coded fields, such as passwords, and credit card information, is masked), and relaxed (no text  
10 entered by a user is masked).<sup>35</sup> When Clarity is set to "relaxed," whatever information a user  
11 enters into the field on a website can be previewed in session recordings.<sup>36</sup> Additionally,  
12 Clarity enables websites to select specific elements and content to mask or unmask,  
13 customizing the standard masking approaches.<sup>37</sup>

14 51. However, even when a website operator selects the "strict" and "balanced"  
15 settings, Clarity is nevertheless capable of collecting text entered by users, including text  
16 containing sensitive information.

17 52. In order for Clarity to capture website visitors' interactions with a website,  
18 Clarity's JavaScript must be installed on the website, either directly hard-coded on the website  
19 or on a third-party platform, such as Google Tag Manager.<sup>38</sup> Clarity is embedded in a website  
20

---

21 <sup>34</sup> Haley Walden, *What is Microsoft Clarity? (& How Can it Improve SEO?)*, Elegant Themes (Jun. 12,  
22 2022), <https://www.elegantthemes.com/blog/wordpress/microsoft-clarity-improve-seo>.

22 <sup>35</sup> *Microsoft Clarity, An Essential Part of Customer Experience Optimization*, TechAir (Aug. 17, 2022),  
23 <https://privacy.microsoft.com/en-US/privacystatement>.

23 <sup>36</sup> *Id.*

23 <sup>37</sup> *Masking Content*, Microsoft (Jul. 18, 2022), <https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/clarity/clarity-masking>.

23 <sup>38</sup> *Set Up Clarity*, Microsoft (Jul. 18, 2022), <https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/clarity/clarity-setup>.

1 by adding its JavaScript code into the HyperText Markup Language (HTML) underlying the  
2 website. As with all HTML code, Clarity is not visible to a user who is navigating a webpage  
3 through a standard browser's default view, because by design a browser will interpret HTML,  
4 without showing it, in order to render a more user-friendly display that is the designer's  
5 intended presentation of the website to a visitor.

6 53. Clarity can be revealed to technical users who understand web technologies and  
7 can enable alternative display modes that will show underlying HTML, such as "developer  
8 tools," but even then, the users would first need to know what they are looking for to find the  
9 script. Developer tools are intended for website programmers, and are generally not meaningful  
10 or comprehensible by those without a background in computer science.

11 54. Once Clarity's JavaScript is installed on a website, Clarity begins collecting  
12 website user's interactions within two hours of installation.<sup>39</sup> Once deployed, Clarity the  
13 wiretapping commences immediately on the visitor's web browser when the visitor loads a  
14 website in their browser.

15 55. Data collected by Clarity is then stored in the Microsoft Aure cloud service and  
16 Microsoft has access to that information.<sup>40</sup>

17 56. Zillow's procurement and use of Microsoft Clarity's Session Replay Code, and  
18 procurement and use of other Session Replay Codes through various Session Replay Providers,  
19 constitutes wiretapping in violation Washington statutory and common law.

## 20 **E. Plaintiffs' and Class Members' Experience.**

21  
22  
23 <sup>39</sup> *Frequently Asked Questions*, Microsoft, <https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/clarity/faq>, (last visited Aug. 24, 2022).

<sup>40</sup> *Id.*

1           57. Plaintiff Perkins has visited Zillow’s website on her computer during the period  
2 from April through June 2021. Plaintiff Perkins visited Zillow’s website for the purposes of  
3 searching for and obtaining a rental apartment. During her visits made during the period April  
4 through June 2021, Plaintiff Perkins substantively engaged with Zillow’s website and entered  
5 certain personal and financial information, such as her name, address, date of birth, phone  
6 number, social security number, and credit information into text fields..


7           58. Plaintiff Hasson routinely visits Zillow’s website to search for properties using  
8 his computer, and he has done so numerous times throughout 2022. During his visits, including  
9 visits made during 2022, Plaintiff Hasson has substantively engaged with Zillow’s website and  
10 has entered personal and financial information, such as name, address, date of birth, phone  
11 number, credit and financial information into text fields.

12           59. While visiting Zillow’s website, Plaintiffs fell victim to Defendants’ unlawful  
13 monitoring, recording, and collection of Plaintiffs’ Website Communications with Zillow’s  
14 website.

15           60. Unbeknownst to Plaintiffs, and without Plaintiffs’ consent, Zillow procures and  
16 embeds Microsoft’s Session Replay Code on its website. Plaintiffs’ Website Communications  
17 were captured by Microsoft’s Session Replay Code and sent to various Session Replay  
18 Providers.


19           61. For example, when visiting Zillow’s website, if a website user views a certain  
20 piece of property for rent or sale, that information is captured by the Session Replay Codes  
21 embedded on the website:  
22  
23





1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8 *Depicting information sent to one of the Service Replay Providers—Microsoft—through*  
9 *a Service Replay Code—Clarity—after viewing a Studio apartment priced at \$1,488*  
10 *while visiting [www.zillow.com](http://www.zillow.com).*


11 62. Similarly, when visiting Zillow’s website, if a user enters personal information  
12 in a text box to schedule a tour, that information is captured by the Session Replay Codes  
13 embedded on the website:



14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19 *Depicting information sent to one of the Service Replay Providers—Microsoft—through*  
20 *a Service Replay Code—Clarity—after entering a name (purple text) to a text box to*  
21 *schedule a tour of a property.*

22 63. The wiretapping by the Session Replay Codes are ongoing during the visit, and  
23 the Session Replay Code intercepts the contents of these communications between Plaintiffs  
and Zillow with instantaneous transmissions to Microsoft’s Session Replay software and other

1 Session Replay Providers, as illustrated below, in which only 30 milliseconds were required to  
 2 send a packet of even response data, which would indicate whatever the website user had just  
 3 done:



16 64. The Session Replay Codes operate in the same manner for all putative Class  
 17 members.

18 65. Like Plaintiffs, each Class member visited Zillow's website with Microsoft's  
 19 and other Session Replay Providers' Code embedded in it. Those Session Replay Codes  
 20 intercepted the Class members' Website Communications with Zillow's website by sending  
 21 hyper-frequent logs of those communications to Session Replay Providers.

22 66. Even if Zillow masks certain elements when it configures the settings of the  
 23 Session Replay Code embedded on its website, any operational iteration of the Session Replay

1 Code will, by its very nature and purpose, intercept the contents of communications between  
2 the website’s visitors and the website owner.

3 67. For example, even with heightened masking enabled, Defendants—through the  
4 use of Session Replay Providers’ Code—are still able to learn through the intercepted data  
5 exactly which pages a user navigates to, how the user moves through the page (such as which  
6 areas the user zooms in on or interacted with), and additional substantive information.

7 68. As a specific example, if a user types a particular address or zip code into  
8 Zillow’s main search bar and initiates a search, even if the text entered into the search bar is  
9 masked, Session Replay Providers will still learn what is entered into the bar as soon as the  
10 search result page loads. This is so because the responsive search results will be displayed on  
11 the subsequent page, and the responsive content generated by Zillow will repeat the searched  
12 information back on the generated page. That information will not be masked even if user-  
13 inputted text is fully masked in a text field.

14 **CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS**

15 69. Plaintiffs bring this action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23  
16 individually and on behalf of the following Class:

17 All natural persons in the United States and its territories whose Website  
18 Communications were captured through the use of Session Replay Code  
embedded in Zillow’s website

19 70. Excluded from the Class are Defendants, their parents, subsidiaries, affiliates,  
20 officers, and directors, all persons who make a timely election to be excluded from the Class,  
21 the judge to whom this case is assigned and any of the judge’s immediate family members, and  
22 the attorneys who enter their appearance in this action.

1           71.     **Numerosity:** The members of the Class are so numerous that individual joinder  
2 of all Class members is impracticable. The precise number of Class members and their  
3 identities may be obtained from the books and records of Defendants or other Session Replay  
4 Providers.

5           72.     **Commonality:** This action involves questions of law and fact that are common  
6 to the Class members. Such common questions include, but are not limited to: (a) whether  
7 Zillow procured Microsoft and other Session Replay Providers to intercept Zillow’s website  
8 visitors’ Website Communications; (b) whether Defendants intentionally disclosed the  
9 intercepted Website Communications of Zillow’s website users; (c) whether Defendants  
10 acquire the contents of website users’ Website Communications without their consent; (d)  
11 whether Defendants’ conduct violates Washington Wiretapping Statute, Wash. Rev. Code  
12 §9.73.030, *et seq.*; (e) whether Plaintiffs and the Class members are entitled to equitable relief;  
13 and (f) whether Plaintiffs and the Class members are entitled to actual, statutory, punitive, or  
14 other forms of damages, and other monetary relief.

15           73.     **Typicality:** Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the other Class members’ claims  
16 because, among other things, all Class members were comparably injured through the uniform  
17 prohibited conduct described above. For instance, Plaintiffs and each member of the Class had  
18 their communications intercepted in violation of the law and their right to privacy. This  
19 uniform injury and the legal theories that underpin recovery make the claims of Plaintiffs and  
20 the members of the Class typical of one another.

21           74.     **Adequacy of Representation:** Plaintiffs have and will continue to fairly and  
22 adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class. Plaintiffs have retained counsel  
23 competent and experienced in complex litigation and class actions, including litigations to

1 remedy privacy violations. Plaintiffs have no interest that is antagonistic to the interests of the  
2 Class, and Defendants have no defenses unique to Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs and their counsel are  
3 committed to vigorously prosecuting this action on behalf of the members of the Class, and  
4 they have the resources to do so. Neither Plaintiffs nor their counsel have any interest adverse  
5 to the interests of the other members of the Class.

6       75.     **Superiority:** This class action is appropriate for certification because class  
7 proceedings are superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of  
8 this controversy and joinder of all members of the Class is impracticable. This proposed class  
9 action presents fewer management difficulties than individual litigation, and provides the  
10 benefits of single adjudication, economies of scale, and comprehensive supervision by a single  
11 court. Class treatment will create economies of time, effort, and expense and promote uniform  
12 decision-making.

13       76.     **Predominance:** Common questions of law and fact predominate over any  
14 questions affecting only individual Class members. Similar or identical violations, business  
15 practices, and injuries are involved. Individual questions, if any, pale by comparison, in both  
16 quality and quantity, to the numerous common questions that dominate this action. For  
17 example, Defendants' liability and the fact of damages is common to Plaintiffs and each  
18 member of the Class. If Defendants intercepted Plaintiffs' and Class members' Website  
19 Communications, then Plaintiffs and each Class member suffered damages by that conduct.

20       77.     **Ascertainability:** Members of the Class are ascertainable. Class membership is  
21 defined using objective criteria and Class members may be readily identified through  
22 Defendants' books and records or the other Session Replay Providers' books and records.

**CHOICE OF LAW**

1  
2 78. Defendants’ actions discussed herein were orchestrated and implemented by  
3 Zillow at its corporate headquarters in Washington, and the conduct Plaintiffs complains of  
4 occurred in, and radiated from, Washington.

5 79. The key wrongdoing at issue in this litigation (Zillow’s procurement of  
6 Microsoft and other Session Replay Providers to intercept Zillow’s website visitors’ Website  
7 Communications; Zillow’s intentional disclosure of the intercepted Website Communications  
8 of its website users; Zillow’s acquisition of the contents of website users’ Website  
9 Communications without their consent; and Zillow’s and Microsoft’s violation of the  
10 Washington Wiretap Statute) emanated from Defendants’ respective headquarters located in  
11 Washington.

12 80. Moreover, Zillow’s Terms of Use specifically state that the “Terms of Use are  
13 governed by the laws of the State of Washington, without giving effect to its conflict of laws’  
14 provisions.” <https://www.zillowgroup.com/terms-of-use/>. Moreover, Zillow states that users  
15 of its website “agree to submit to the personal and exclusive jurisdiction and venue in the state  
16 and federal courts sitting in King County, Washington for any and all disputes, claims and  
17 actions arising from or in connection with the Services or otherwise under these Terms of Use.”  
18 <https://www.zillowgroup.com/terms-of-use/>.

19 81. Washington, which seeks to protect the rights and interests of Washington and  
20 other U.S. consumers against a company doing business in Washington, has a greater interest in  
21 the claims of Plaintiffs and the Class than any other state and is most intimately concerned with  
22 the outcome of this litigation.



1 dollars, and a reasonable attorney’s fee and other costs of litigation.” Wash. Rev. Code  
2 §9.73.060.

3 87. Zillow and Microsoft are persons for purposes of the Act because they are  
4 corporations.

5 88. Session Replay Code like that licensed by Microsoft and procured by Zillow is a  
6 “device” that is “designed to record and/or transmit” communications within the meaning of  
7 the Act.

8 89. Plaintiffs’ and Class members’ intercepted Website Communications constitute  
9 “private communications” within the meaning of the Act.

10 90. Defendants intentionally procure and embed Microsoft’s Session Replay Code  
11 and other Session Replay Providers Code on Zillow’s website to spy on, automatically and  
12 secretly, and to intercept Zillow’s website visitors’ electronic interactions communications with  
13 Zillow in real time.

14 91. Plaintiffs’ and Class members’ electronic communications are intercepted  
15 contemporaneously with their transmission.

16 92. Plaintiffs and Class members did not consent to having their Website  
17 Communications wiretapped.

18 93. Pursuant to Wash. Rev. Code §9.73.060, Plaintiffs and the Class members seek  
19 (1) actual damages, not less than liquidated damages computed at the rate of one hundred  
20 dollars a day for each day of violation, not to exceed one thousand dollars, and (2) reasonable  
21 attorneys’ fees and other costs of litigation incurred.

22 94. Defendants’ conduct is ongoing, and they continue to unlawfully intercept the  
23 communications of Plaintiffs and Class members any time they visit Zillow’s website with



1 Microsoft’s Session Replay Code enabled without their consent. Plaintiffs and Class members  
2 are entitled to declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent future interceptions of their  
3 communications and to require Zillow to obtain consent prior to utilizing Microsoft’s Session  
4 Replay Code and other Session Replay Providers Code to intercept website visitors’ electronic  
5 communications on Zillow’s website.

6 **COUNT II**  
7 **Invasion of Privacy – Intrusion Upon Seclusion**

8 95. Plaintiffs incorporate the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.

9 96. Washington common law recognizes the tort of invasion of privacy. The right to  
10 privacy is also established in the Constitution of the State of Washington which explicitly  
11 recognizes an individual’s right to privacy under Article 1 §7: “No person shall be disturbed in  
12 his private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of law.”

13 97. Plaintiffs bring this claim individually and on behalf of the Class.

14 98. Plaintiffs and Class members have an objective, reasonable expectation of  
15 privacy in their Website Communications.

16 99. Plaintiffs and Class members did not consent to, authorize, or know about  
17 Defendants’ intrusion at the time it occurred. Plaintiffs and Class members never agreed that  
18 Defendants could collect or disclose their Website Communications.

19 100. Plaintiffs and Class members had a legitimate and reasonable expectation of  
20 privacy in precluding the dissemination and/or misuse of their information and communications  
21 and in conducting their personal activities without intrusion or interference, including the right  
22 to not have their personal information intercepted and utilized for business gain.

23 101. Defendants intentionally intrude on Plaintiffs’ and Class members’ private life,  
seclusion, or solitude, without consent.

1           102. Defendants' conduct is highly offensive and objectionable to a reasonable  
2 person and constitutes an egregious breach of the social norms underlying the right to privacy.

3           103. Defendants' conduct, by unlawfully intercepting the communications of  
4 Plaintiffs and Class members any time they visit Zillow's website with Microsoft's Session  
5 Replay Code enabled without their consent, was a proximate cause of damage to Plaintiffs and  
6 Class members.

7           104. Plaintiffs and Class members were harmed by Defendants' wrongful conduct as  
8 Defendants' conduct has caused Plaintiffs and the Class mental anguish and suffering arising  
9 from their loss of privacy and confidentiality of their electronic communications.

10           105. Defendants' conduct has needlessly harmed Plaintiffs and the Class by capturing  
11 intimately personal facts and data in the form of their Website Communications. This  
12 disclosure and loss of privacy and confidentiality has caused Plaintiffs and the Class to  
13 experience mental anguish, emotional distress, worry, fear, and other harms.

14           106. Additionally, given the monetary value of individual personal information,  
15 Defendants deprived Plaintiffs and Class members of the economic value of their interactions  
16 with Defendant's website, without providing proper consideration for Plaintiffs' and Class  
17 members' property.

18           107. Further, Defendants have improperly profited from their invasion of Plaintiffs  
19 and Class members' privacy in their use of this data for their economic gain.

20           108. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants conduct, Plaintiffs and Class  
21 members are entitled to damages, including compensatory, punitive, and/or nominal damages,  
22 in an amount to be proven at trial.

1 109. Defendants' conduct is ongoing, and they continue to unlawfully intercept the  
2 communications of Plaintiffs and Class members any time they visit Zillow's website with  
3 Microsoft's Session Replay Code and other Session Replay Providers Code enabled without  
4 their consent. Plaintiffs and Class members are entitled to declaratory and injunctive relief to  
5 prevent future interceptions of their communications.

6 **REQUEST FOR RELIEF**

7 Plaintiffs, individually and on behalf of themselves and the other members of the  
8 proposed Class, respectfully request that the Court enter judgment in Plaintiffs' and the Class's  
9 favor and against Defendants as follows:

- 10 A. Certifying the Class and appointing Plaintiffs as the Class representatives;
- 11 B. Appointing Plaintiffs' counsel as class counsel;
- 12 C. Declaring that Defendants' past conduct was unlawful, as alleged herein;
- 13 D. Declaring Defendants' ongoing conduct is unlawful, as alleged herein;
- 14 E. Enjoining Defendants from continuing the unlawful practices described herein,  
15 and awarding such injunctive and other equitable relief as the Court deems just and proper;
- 16 F. Awarding Plaintiffs and the Class members statutory, actual, compensatory,  
17 consequential, punitive, and nominal damages, as well as restitution and/or disgorgement of  
18 profits unlawfully obtained;
- 19 G. Awarding Plaintiffs and the Class members pre-judgment and post-judgment  
20 interest;
- 21 H. Awarding Plaintiffs and the Class members reasonable attorneys' fees, costs, and  
22 expenses; and
- 23 I. Granting such other relief as the Court deems just and proper.

**DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL**

Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and the Class, demand a trial by jury of any and all issues in this action so triable of right.

DATED this 12th day of September, 2022.

TOUSLEY BRAIN STEPHENS PLLC

By: s/ Kim D. Stephens, P.S.  
Kim D. Stephens, P.S., WSBA #11984  
kstephens@tousley.com  
s/ Jason T. Dennett  
Jason T. Dennett, WSBA #30686  
jdennett@tousley.com  
s/ Kaleigh N. Boyd  
Kaleigh N. Boyd, WSBA #52684  
kboyd@tousley.com  
1200 Fifth Avenue, Suite 1700  
Seattle, Washington 98101  
Telephone: 206.682.5600  
Fax: 206.682.2992

Joseph P. Guglielmo, (*pro hac vice* forthcoming)  
Carey Alexander (*pro hac vice* forthcoming)  
Ethan Binder (*pro hac vice* forthcoming)  
**SCOTT+SCOTT ATTORNEYS  
AT LAW LLP**  
The Helmsley Building  
230 Park Avenue, 17th Floor  
New York, NY 10169  
Telephone: (212) 223-6444  
Facsimile: (212) 223-6334  
jguglielmo@scott-scott.com  
calexander@scott-scott.com  
ebinder@scott-scott.com

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23

E. Kirk Wood (*pro hac vice* forthcoming)  
Sharika Robinson (*pro hac vice* forthcoming)  
Marcela Jenkins (*pro hac vice* forthcoming)  
**WOOD LAW FIRM, LLC**  
P. O. Box 382434  
Birmingham, AL 35238-2434  
Telephone: (205) 908-4906  
kirk@woodlawfirmllc.com

Gary F. Lynch (*pro hac vice* forthcoming)  
Kelly K. Iverson (*pro hac vice* forthcoming)  
Jamisen A. Etzel (*pro hac vice* forthcoming)  
Elizabeth Pollock-Avery (*pro hac vice* forthcoming)  
Nicholas A. Colella (*pro hac vice* forthcoming)  
Patrick D. Donathen (*pro hac vice* forthcoming)  
**LYNCH CARPENTER, LLP**  
1133 Penn Avenue, 5<sup>th</sup> Floor  
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15222  
Telephone: 412-322-9243  
Facsimile: 412-231-0246  
gary@lcllp.com  
kelly@lcllp.com  
jamisen@lcllp.com  
elizabeth@lcllp.com  
nickc@lcllp.com  
patrick@lcllp.com

*Attorneys for Plaintiffs and the Putative Class*